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THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN
WEST VIRGINIA
HAL

J. POSTN*

A phase of the field of civil law which seldom comes within
the experience of the average practitioner concerns itself with the
negligence of physicians and surgeons in the practice of their profession, which is classified under the broad general term of malpractice. As the practice of medicine in its various branches tends
to become a business rather than a personal relation, and the
paternal position of the family physician faces into the limbo of
forgotten things, it is likely that actions against doctors for their
acts of negligence in the exercise of their art will become more,
rather than less, frequent. When the medical profession laid aside
as outmoded and unsanitary the shawl of the family doctor, who
served as friend and confidant as well as physician, and assumed
the efficient white jacket of specialization and commercialism, it
likewise lost the armor of infallibility that the shawl concealed.
Although present day methods are undoubtedly the better, they
must stand alone in the full glare of the light of scientific merit,
unprotected by the shadows of friendship.
As evidence of the former reluctance of patients to question
the wisdom of their doctors, it is to be noted that relatively few
cases have appeared in the records of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia concerning civil suits for malpractice by
physicians, and a portion of these hereinafter considered do not
involve this question directly. Even considering the numerical
paucity of West Virginia decisions on the question, the cases thereunder run the entire gamut of topics involved, and are the subject
of most thorough and excellent opinions. Practically every West
Virginia case of this type is recognized as authority upon its subject in all jurisdictions, and a study of the general law of malpractice encounters many citations to the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
It is well established by precedent that the ordinary relation
of physician and patient is more nearly consensual than contractual. The relation and rights and duties incident thereto have
their inception in the position in which the parties find themselves
placed through force of circumstance, rather than by any specific,
voluntary agreement. Due to the peculiar nature of the relation,
*Member of the Monongalia County Bar.
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the remedies for violation of the duties thereof are twofold. If
the unusual case of a special contract exists, then of course the
remedy may be directly on that contract. If, however, no such
contract is made, there is still the implied contract of service, upon
which an action may be maintained. In either instance a breach
of the professional duty involves a charge of negligence and an
action may be maintained for the resulting injury. Text writers
have sometimes said that the patient may have his election of an
action for the tort, or may waive the tort and proceed on the contract, either express or implied. Whatever view is taken the result is the same; the injured party has his choice of remedies.
The law in West Virginia as to the dual nature of the remedy
was first stated in Kuhn v. Brownfield.,
That and subsequent
cases have made it clear that either case or assumpsit may be maintained for malpractice. The court bases liability upon breach of
an implied obligation arising from the employment.
The Duty
An orderly survey of authorities discloses that the cases
naturally align themselves into groups: first, those arising out of
a specific contract; second, those arising through the implications
of the relation of physician and patient. The duties and liabilities
incident to the former are of course dictated by the nature and
wording of the contract of employment itself, and thus each such
case must stand alone. As concerns the second group, however,
we find a situation which provokes comment.
The duty of a physician to his patient, briefly stated, is laid
down as follows :2
"The physician is bound to bestow such reasonable
ordinary care, skill and diligence as physicians and surgeons
in the same neighborhood, in the same general line of practice
ordinarily have and exercise in like cases."
In this statement of the law is contained the essential differentiation between ordinary actionable negligence and that
special duty to which physicians and surgeons are bound, that is
to say, the duty and liability of the physician are measured on a
yardstick of care graduated on the basis of time and locality. It
requires but a casual contemplation of the unique position of the
12 34 W. Va. 252, 12 S. E. 519 (1890).
Lawson v. Conaway, 37 W. Va. 159, 168, 16 S. E. 564 (1892).
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doctor to recognize the wisdom of such a rule of law, for if the
standard were different, as the late Chief Justice Taft has so well
said :3
few would be courageous enough to practice the
.....
healing art, for they would have to assume financial liability
for nearly all the ills that flesh is heir to."
In Dye v. Corbin,4 which is a leading case upon the particular
subject, the plaintiff, residing in a remote region of Ritchie County,
suffered an injury to his ankle, which was diagnosed and treated
as a dislocation by the local physician. Some six months later,
the injury not healing satisfactorily, the plaintiff journeyed to
Cincinnati, Ohio, and there by means of the radiograph determined that there was actually a fracture as well as a dislocation,
and that the fracture had knitted improperly. Subsequently it
became necessary to amputate the foot. In an action of trespass
on the case against the attending physician, a verdict was directed
for the defendant physician, which the Supreme Court of Appeals
in affirming said:
"..... a physician is not required to exercise the highest
degree of skill and diligence possible in the treatment of an
injury or disease unless he has by special contract agreed to
do so. In the absence of such special contract, he is only required to exercise such reasonable and ordinary skill and
diligence as are ordinarily exercised by the average of the
members of the profession in good standing in similar localities and in the same general line of practice, regard being
had to the state of medical science at the time."
And
"Where a physician exercises ordinary skill and diligence
keeping within recognized and approved methods, he is not
liable for a result of a mere mistake of judgment. The physician is liable for an error in judgment where the error is so
gross as to be inconsistent with that degree of skill which it is
the duty of a physician to possess."
It will thus be seen that there can be no arbitrary standard
of care laid down, but that the rule must necessarily be an elastic
one, which can be equitably applied to any situation. Thus less
is expected of a country doctor than a city physician; the latter
has the advantage of more varied observation and experience and
a Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442, 443 (C. C. S. D. Ohio, 1897).
4 59 W. Va. 266, 270, 273, 53 S. E. 147 (1906).
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is in closer touch with improvements in medical science.' The
cases, as further stated, make a distinction, and a wise one, between errors in judgment and errors in execution.
The next important case in West Virginia, both in point of
time and legal interest, is that of Browning v. Hoffman,0 which
was twice before the Supreme Court of Appeals, with Judge
Poffenbarger rendering the opinion of the court in each instance.
For the purposes of this discussion, the cases may be treated as
one. The plaintiff suffered a fracture of the leg and was taken
to the hospital of the defendant and there treated by the defendant,
who was called out of town upon important business for a short
period. During the absence of the defendant, and while the plaintiff was still in the hospital under the care of an assistant to the
defendant, he developed a severe infection, which the plaintiff
claimed was the result of the application of an improper east by
the defendant. The infection necessitated the amputation of the
leg. The jury in each instance awarded a verdict for the plaintiff, and the Supreme Court of Appeals in turn, a new trial. The
court recognized that a surgeon may adopt a method approved in
the community and that if there be two or more approved methods
he may choose between them.
It has been seen that the doctor's duty depends largely upon
his good faith and honest effort, and for an honest error in judgment, as in making a diagnosis, there can be no liability, providing
he has exercised due diligence in arriving at a decision and action
7
upon it thereafter.

Abandonment is a common ground for liability in malpractice
cases. The duty in this respect is to continue attendance as long
as reasonable and ordinary skill require, unless the employment
is sooner terminated by the parties.8 Circumstances may sometimes preclude personal attendance and justify temporary competent attendance by another under the doctor's personal
direction. 9
The court has laid down a very strict rule of liability for a
breach of this duty. In a recent case the defendant physician had
5 Lawson v. Conaway, supra n. 2.

6 86 W. Va. 468, 103 S. E. 484 (1920), rehearing 90 W. Va. 568, 111 S. E.
492 (1922).
7 Jenkins v. Hospital, 90 W. Va. 230, 110 S. E. 560 (1922); Vaughm v.
Hospital, 100 W. Va. 290, 130 S. B. 481 (1925), rehearing 103 W. Va. 156,
136 S. E. 837 (1927).
sLawson v. Conaway, supra n. 2.
g Browning v. Hoffman, supra n. 6.
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undertaken to care for the plaintiff during childbirth, but the process being a slow one, he went to visit another patient in the same
condition, and his presence being needed, he was unable to return
to the plaintiff for several hours, during which time the plaintiff
had been attended by another physician. The court in reversing a
judgment for the defendant, lays down this very strict rule :10
"After giving medicine to accelerate plaintiff's labor, it
was the absolute duty of the defendant to remain where he
could be reached when needed, or to provide a competent
physician in his place. His engagement was to give the case
close attention."
This case was, of course, an aggravated one, and in all likelihood
the decision will be limited in its application as a precedent.
In a somewhat similar case the defendant physician in his
treatment of the plaintiff administered to her a 'drug capable of
producing serious results and then absented himself for several
days. The evidence discloses that the defendant had requested
another physician to care for his practice for a few days, but had
failed to inform the plaintiff of the arrangement or to advise the
substitute physician of the plaintiff's condition and treatment. 1
The court held that defendant's conduct constituted abandonment
of the patient.
.Itwould seem, therefore, that while the court is inclined to
be lenient with the physician who in the exercise of honest effort
fails either through mistake or other innocent cause to effect a
good result, it is, on the other hand, very strict in requiring attention and attendance upon the patient by the physician who has
undertaken the treatment.
Liabiity of the Physician in the Absence of Personal Negligence
We have thus far considered the liability of the physician for
lack of skill or attention, both of which may be classified as negligence. There are in addition to these bases of liability, others
wherein personal negligence is absent. First, we have operations
performed without the consent of either the patient or some one
authorized to give such consent.
"Except in very extreme cases, a surgeon has no legal
right to operate upon a patient without his consent, nor upon
a child without the consent of its parent or guardian."' 2
10 Young v. Jordan, 106 W. Va. 139, 141, 145 S.E. 41 (1928).
11 Howel v. Biggart, 108 W. Va. 560, 152 S. E. 323 (1930).

12 See Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568, 581, 111 S.E. 492 (1922).
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This dictum is in accord with the general law that such an
operation must not be performed without the consent of some one
authorized to give it, except in such emergency as would imply
consent. Although no very definite rule is laid down as to how
the existence of such an emergency is to be determined, it is to be
logically supposed that the courts will be guided in this regard by
the testimony of physicians as to the established practice. It
should be observed that liability in such a case is grounded on
trespass to the person and not malpractice.'
The second ground of liability wherein there is absence of
personal negligence by the physician is for the negligent act of
an assistant or nurse under the supervision and direction of the
defendant physician. We find no West Virginia case four square
upon this point, but that the physician is liable for the negligence
of his assistant or a nurse under his supervision is tacitly recognized in several cases. In one case' the defendant physicians were
partners maintaining a private hospital in which an operation was
performed on the plaintiff by one of the defendants, and of which
operation she complained. She based her action against the partners upon the alleged breach of the implied contract, so that although the case does not depend upon the agency principle, nevertheless it does not expressly repudiate it, and by implication accepts the rule. In the second Browning v. Hoffman case the plaintiff offered an instruction based upon negligence of an attending
nurse. The court in referring thereto said :1r,

"As she was competent and experienced there was no
negligence on the part of the defendants in relying upon her
judgment in matters properly entrusted to her, and an honest
mistake on her part, if made, would not have been negligence
any more than such a mistake on the part of a physician would
be."
By inference, therefore, since the liability of the defendant
physician is not denied, had negligence existed on the part of the
nurse, it can be assumed that liability is recognized.
Liability of Third Parties
A kindred subject now discussed parenthetically is that of the
liability of third persons generally for the negligence of physicians.
Such third persons are usually of two groups, first, hospitals em13

Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 Pac. 96 (1913).

14 Cook v. Coleman, 90 W. Va. 748, 111 S. E. 750 (1922).

i

5

upra n. 6, at 582.
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ploying physicians, or, second, employers who by contract with
their employees maintain a medical service for them.
A hospital under common agency principles should be held
responsible for the negligence of agents in matters within the
scope of their authority. The measure of care and attention that
the law exacts is tempered by the capacity of a patient to attend
Constant attention is not ordinarily
to his own safety."
required.1 7
The court, however, at least by dictum adopts the view that
8
a private charitable hospital is not subject to vicarious liability.3
This rule, while in accord with the weight of authority, is subject
to criticism and has been repudiated in some jurisdictions. 19 The
reasoning in support of it, - that such institutions "administer
trust funds, and it is not just that they be dissipated with (tort)
liabilities .. ..",2o suggests the alarming idea that a settlor can
insulate his charitable bequest from liability for tort. It is, moreover, a strange quality of charity that insists that the institution
be irresponsible when it increases the need of one object of charity
so that it may keep going to aid others irresponsibly. A private
hospital cannot escape liability upon the ground that the attending
physician is an independent contractor, 2' and a charitable institution should be held to the same rule. State and municipal institutions are not liable in tort because of their governmental character. The immunity might well be qualified by statute.
Another such type of liability is that of an employer to an
employee who is treated by a physician retained by the employer
for the purpose of treating the employee. The law in this regard

has been thus stated :22
"Where an incorporated lumber company agrees with an
employee in consideration of monthly deductions therefor from
his wages, to furnish and obtain a skilled physician to attend
to and treat him for any sickness of accident occurring while
in its service, it is bound thereby to select and retain for that
purpose a physician having the knowledge and skill ordinarily
possessed by other members of the profession in the same
community."
10 Hogan v. Hospital, 63 W. Va. 84, 59 S. E. 945 (1907).
17 Ibd.
2 Supra n. 16.
19 Geiger v. Simpson Methodist-Episcopal Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N.

W. 463 (1928).
20 See Jenkins v. Hospital, supra n. 7, at 233.
2
1 Vaughn v. Hospital, supra n. 7.
22 Neil v. Lumber Co., 71 W. Va. 708, syl. 1, 77 S. E. 324 (1913).
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For breach of this duty the employer will be liable to the same
extent that the doctor would be in a malpractice action. It seems
that here the liability is not based upon agency, but upon the
assumpsit theory predicated upon the contract between the employer and employee. The court makes a distinction between an
the doctor for his tort and
action by the employee patient against
23
against the employer on his contraet.
Another case, although not exactly of the type here considered, but embodying the same principles, is Tompkins v. Insurance Company, 4 wherein the plaintiff, who darried a policy of
accident insurance with the defendant company, suffered an injury, was treated by his own physician, and in compliance with
his policy and with specific instruction from the defendant company, submitted himself to the defendant's physician for the purpose of examination. In making such examination, the company's
physician removed a plaster cast from the injured member, did
not replace it, and advised the plaintiff as to a course of procedure which plaintiff claimed resulted in injury. The court there
held the insurance company liable for such injury on the ground
of agency, although the examining physician did not have authority from the company to prescribe for claimant.
Defenses
That contributory negligence of the plaintiff is ordinarily a
bar to recovery is, of course, a general principle of tort law.
25
Doubtless this is so as a general matter in malpractice cases.

The rule has been qualified in later cases, which distinguish between concurrent and subsequent contributory negligence. They
treat the latter as a basis for mitigating damages, but not for defeating the action.
"If . . . .the patient being competently advised of the
necessity of further diagnosis and treatment within the period
of such relation and within a reasonable time after the date
of the wound, ignores it, and neither returns to the hospital
nor procures treatment elsewhere until after the trouble has
become irremediable, his right of recovery is limited to such
damages as accrued before his negligence occurred, if the prior
and subsequent damages can be separated by the jury." 20

'23Ashby v. Coal Co., 95 W. Va. 372, 121 S.B. 174 (1924) ; Hinkelman v.
Steel Co., 171 S. E. 538 (W. Va. 1933).
24 53 W. Va. 479, 44 S. E. 439 (1903).
25 Lawson v. Conaway, supra n.2.
26 Jenkins v. Hospital, supra n.7, syl. 5.
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This seems a just and equitable rule. Whether or not it is
practicable is another matter. Even so, in a proper case the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed as to its powers in
this regard.
It appears that malpractice actions, whether the form be
assumpsit2 7 or case,2- must be commenced within one year after
the cause of action arose. Thus suit must be brought promptly
to preclude the defense of the statute of limitations.
A third ground of defense little known and little used, but
clearly the law of this jurisdiction, arises out of the situation
wherein the attending physician brings an action to recover for
his services to the patient, and the patient subsequently institutes
an action for alleged malpractice. If the patient makes a general
appearance to the physician's action he must rely on malpractice
as a defense or by way of recoupment and if he does not do so,
his cause of action is lost.29 The patient may appear to disclaim
the waiver of his claim.
There is a marked division of authority upon this proposition, both among the courts of other jurisdictions and text writers.
The above-cited decision was the subject of an able and vigorous
dissent, which well presented the logic of the opposite view. The
argument on the one side is that one who is brought into court
is bound to present every defense that he may have to an action,
lest he be forever barred therefrom.
On the other hand is presented the very reasonable position that the action of the physician
for the value of his services is an action on the contract whereas
the claim of the patient is essentially a tortious one and, therefore, the two matters need not be litigated in the same suit. Of
course, actions for malpractice can be treated, and indeed pleaded,
as contractual, but in any event malpractice constitutes an independent cause of action as well as a defense to the claim for medical service.
The dissenting opinion contains the additional argument that
the disproportionate amounts of the two claims precluded their
trial in the same courts under West Virginia statutes; that the
claim of the physician was for too small an amount for the circuit
court, and that of the patient for too large an amount for the
justice court. Such a position is not tenable in view of the qualifications placed upon the rule in the majority opinion quoted, to
27Kuhn v. Brownfield, supra n. 1.
28 Neil v. Lumber Co., supra 3. 22.
29 See Lawson v. Conaway, supra n. 2.
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the effect that the patient may appear in the physician's action
against him and have the records show that he does not waive his
right.
The rule as thus laid down is not unduly harsh when it is
fully considered, for the patient debars himself from his right of
an action only by his own election, for if he fails to appear and
judgment is rendered against him by default, he is not harmed,
as he may appear and disclaim a waiver of his alleged right; but
if he elects to defend the action brought by the physician, he
should in the public interest, be required to raise all defenses
available to him. Regardless of the conflicting principles involved and the many arguments which may be presented on both
sides, the statement above is the law of this jurisdiction.
Another interesting defense in such actions arises where the
plaintiff injured by the negligent act of a third party, is treated
by a physician who is guilty of malpractice in such treatment, and
subsequently executed a release of the original tort-feasor. Such
a release constitutes a discharge of liability of the offending
physician, according to a recent decision. In that case the plaintiff was a minor. The physician was selected by the plaintiff's
father, and after treatment was rendered, a statutory compromise
was effected, which the Supreme Court of Appeals held to be a
satisfaction of all immediate and direct damages flowing from the
original injury, including malpractice by the attending physician.
The court said :30
"It is a general rule that if an injured person uses ordinary care in selecting a physician ....
the law regards an injury resulting from mistakes of the physician or his want of
skill, or a failure of the means employed to effect a cure, as
a part of the immediate and direct damages which naturally
flow from the original injury."
Soon after the enunciation of this broad rule, it became necessary for the court to limit its application by confining the scope
of such releases to matters which might fairly be said to have been
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the execution of the release. 31 In this case the release was executed prior
to the conclusion of the treatment by the physician. The Supreme
Court of Appeals distinguishes the two cases by the fact that in
the former the release of the original wrongdoer was executed
so Mier v. Yoho, 171 S. E. 538, syl. 1 (W. Va. 1933).
31 Conley v. Hill, 174 S. B. 884 (W. Va. 1934).
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subsequently to the physician's treatment, whereas in the latter
case the release of the original tort-feasor preceded the treatment.
Certainly the rule as originally laid down, without the qualifications in the second case, was capable of gross misinterpretation, and could well lead to large injustice. However, the qualifications placed upon the rule remedy its patent defect where it
is made affirmatively to appear that a release of the subsequent
damages is intended by the parties. The objection to the rule is,
of course, that there are in fact two distinct torts. The original
tort-feasor is liable only for the injury he has done and not for
aggravation of it by the plaintiff's physician. Although the damages resulting from the two torts may not be separable, a method
of expediency in arriving at a basis of compensation is no justification for the establishment of a precedent not based upon true
legal principles.
A fifth bar is the acceptance by the plaintiff of the benefits
of workmen's compensation fund for an injury received in the
course of his employment, in the treatment of which injury a
physician acting for the employer has been guilty of malpractice.
On this state of facts the court has reasoned that since the action
of the doctor came within the compensation act he should not be
personally liable.3 2
If there is substance in the idea that the
threat of liability for malpractice tends to make doctors more careful, why r~move that sanction here?
This case is very similar in its facts to an earlier decision
wherein the opposite result was reached.33 However, the cases can
be distinguished by the fact that in the later case the action was
in tort directly against the attending physician for the aggravation of the injury, whereas the action in the earlier case was
against the employer for damage as a result of the breach of its
contract to provide a competent physician. The court said in the
earlier case that the employee's contract with the defendant company for medical services removed the case from the contemplation of the Workmen's Compensation Law.
The Trial
Assuming that the plaintiff has finally reached the stage of
the proceedings wherein he is permitted to present his case to a
jury, he is confronted by many more difficulties. Of course, in
common with every other plaintiff, he must assume the burden of
32 Hinkleman v. Steel Co., supra n. 23.
33 Ashiey v. Coal Co., supra n. 23.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1934

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [1934], Art. 3
46

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN WEST VIRGINIA

proof, and perhaps his burden is even heavier than that of the
ordinary plaintiff.
If, as the cases hold, there is no presumption of negligence
attached to the defendant by virtue of poor results to the patient,8 4
and if the rule of res ipsa loquitur does not apply," how must the
plaintiff sustain his allegations? In this connection a division of
the subject into two heads is perhaps advisable: first, the evidence
itself; second, witnesses.
It is obvious that in malpractice cases expert testimony is required to establish, for example, whether or not the recognized
standards of practice have been complied with.
"In determining these questions the evidence of the
physicians and surgeons should have peculiar weight.
The
ordinary layman does not know whether a particular surgical
treatment accords with the standard or usual treatment sanctioned by the profession in that or similar localities.
The
patient cannot fix a standard of his own, neither can the
jury. "3
There is a more recent decision to the effect that cases may
arise where there is such marked want of skill that lay witnesses
may be called upon to establish it without any expert testimony
whatever.37 The idea, at best, should be exploited sparingly.
Of course a witness may testify only to matters within his
personal knowledge; "s but he is entitled to refresh his memory
from a document made by another furnished him in the usual
course of business.8 9 And a surgeon under whose direction and
for whose use X-ray plates were made, may introduce them in
evidence although they were not taken or developed in his
presence. 40
Testimony that a hospital excluded operations therein by
other than members of the staff is admissible in evidence4 as is
testimony of another physician as to advice he gave to the plaintiff at the time of the injury. 2 Variance between the testimony
of an expert witness in two trials of the same case, or between the
testimony of one expert and that of another, does not render such
34 Dye v. Corbin, supra n. 4.
35 Vaughn v. Hospital, supra n. 7.
36 Id. at 103W . Va. 163.
37Buskirk v. Bucklew, 176 S. E. 603 (W. Va. 1934).
38 Browning v. Hoffman, supra n. 6.
39 Ibid.
40 Jenkins v. Hospital, supra n. 7.
41 Browning
42 aid.

v. Hoffman, supra n. 6.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol41/iss1/3

12

Posten: The Law of Medical Malpractice in West Virginia
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
testimony inadmissible. 43 It would seem that a witness when competent may testify not only as to physical facts but as to his
motives and intentions by showing that he acted in a certain manner for a certain reason. 4 Another exception to the rule heretofore enunciated concerning the importance of expert testimony is
that a lay witness who was familiar with the facts should have been
permitted to testify to the plaintiff's ability to perform manual
45
labor before and after the alleged injury.
Further in derogation of the common rules, it has been held
that where the declaration charges want of skill and care in general terms and no specific act, the defendant physician may introduce evidence of his reputation for skill and care in his profes4
sional duties.
In the first Browning case it was held error to permit the
introduction of evidence concerning an outmoded method of treatment upon the question of choice of methods.4 7 Testimony that
the plaintiff withdrew from the defendant's hospital and refused
to permit another operation because of her lack of confidence in
the defendant, is inadmissible.," It has been held that even though
one of the acts relied on as negligence was a violation of law, the
fact that it did constitute such violation was not admissible on the
issue of negligence. 49 Admissioils of assisting nurse as to the manner of performing the operation, if made some days after the
operation, have been excluded as hearsay. 0 It has been held that
the fact that it became necessary to amputate a patient's leg to
save his life is evidence for the jury to consider in determining
whether or not the physician treating the original injury was
guilty of negligence."
There is apparent conflict between the decisions in Browning
3
V. Hoffman,8 2 and Vaughin v. Hospital,"
as to the weight to be
given to the evidence of physicians and surgeons concerning the
standard of the community. The former decision approved an
instruction to the effect that the jury should give to expert testi4s !bid.
44 Lawson

45 hid.

v. Conaway, supra n. 2.

Dudley v. Grace Hospital, 112 W. Va. 461, 164 S. E. 470 (1932).
v. Hoffman, supra n. 6.
48 Cook V. Coleman, supra n. 14.
40 7bid.
48

47 Browning

50

Tbid.

51 Maxwell v. Howell, 173 S. E. 553 (W. Va. 1934).
52 Supra n. 6.
03

$upran. 7,
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mony such weight and credit as they should think it entitled to
receive; on the other hand, the opinion in the Vaughn case declares that in determining the compliance of the defendant with
the requisite standards "the evidence of physicians and surgeons
should have peculiar weight." These apparently divergent views
can be reconciled only by consideration of the fact that the testimony in the Vaughn case was concerned solely with the question
of standards of the profession, a matter peculiarly within the
knowledge of the expert witness, whereas the instruction approved
in the Browning case referred to the question of the testimony
of experts generally. We take it that despite the approval of this
instruction by the court, the law of West Virginia remains that
the standard of a particular community must be established by the
testimony of expert witnesses.
Verdict
Assuming that despite the many obstacles thrown in the way
of the plaintiff, he does make a case against the defendant for his
negligence, there may be difficulties as to the amount of recovery.
The only West Virginia decision discussing the amount of recovery
4
directly in this type of case is that of Nel v. Lumber Company,5
wherein it was held that $3000.00 was not excessive for a 21 year
old boy whose leg was substantially shortened by the failure of
the physician to set it properly. Among the cases, which were
reversed upon other grounds, but wherein the amount of the verdict was not attacked as excessive, are Browning v. Hoffman,"
where $5000.00 was awarded to an 18 year old plaintiff for the
amputation of a leg, and Vaughn v. Hospitalr8 where $4695.00 was
awarded to the plaintiff for the loss of a foot.
So it seems there is not categorical distinction between the
damages which may be awarded in cases of this type and in others
involving personal injury. The courts are somewhat loath to permit punitive damages in cases of medical malpractice, but in a
proper case such damages may be allowed.
CONCLUsION

The foregoing discussion contains excerpts from or citations
to every reported West Virginia decision upon this topic. There
has been no attempt at comprehensive comment or criticism. The
54 S pra

n. 22.
55 Browning v. Hoffman, supra n. 6, rehearing.
56 Vaughn v. Hospital, supra n. 7, rehearing.
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purpose in the main of the discussion, aside from whatever value
it may have as the only compilation of West Virginia authorities
upon this subject, is to call to the attention of the bar a matter
of vital interest.
The professions of law and medicine are so
closely allied that in matters involving a charge of professional
misconduct their interests should be identical.
Such a charge
against a member of either profession, no matter how groundless,
works an almost irreparable injury. Properly viewed, the primary
interest of the public and the secondary interest of the professions
are not only consistent but go hand in hand. In behalf of both
it is important that the law involving charges of professional malpractice be not only fundamentally sound and correctly interpreted, but well understood by the profession at large.
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